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CVE-2026-111756

HIGH 8.2

Published 2026-10-20 · Last modified 2026-10-23

follow-redirects is a Node.js HTTP and HTTPS client wrapper that automatically follows redirects. From version 1.16.0 to before version 1.16.1, follow-redirects removes sensitive credential headers (Authorization, Proxy-Authorization, Cookie, and any caller-declared sensitiveHeaders) before following a redirect that crosses to a different host or downgrades to a less secure protocol. The removal routine iterates the caller's headers container with for...in and matches header names against a filter. This assumes the headers container is a plain object keyed by header names. Node's underlying http.request, which follow-redirects is a drop-in replacement for, also accepts headers as an alternating array of names and values. For an array, for...in yields the numeric indices "0", "1", "2" and so on, which never match a header-name filter, so nothing is removed. An application that sends array-form headers and follows an attacker-controlled cross-origin redirect therefore forwards its Authorization, Cookie, and Proxy-Authorization headers verbatim to the attacker-controlled destination, with no error or warning. The sensitiveHeaders option added to fix CVE-2026-40895 / GHSA-r4q5-vmmm-2653 is equally ineffective, because it relies on the same helper. This is an unauthenticated confidentiality vulnerability: any remote server the victim application contacts can harvest the victim's credential headers by responding with a cross-origin redirect. This issue has been patched in version 1.16.1.

ELEVATED IMPACT

Severe if exploited (CVSS 8.2), but no known exploitation and low modeled probability. Patch on a normal cadence.

Exploitation likelihood

0.5%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 41st percentile

○ In CISA KEV ○ Catalogued PoC

Impact if exploited

8.2CVSS 4.0 · HIGH

  • ConfidentialityHigh
  • IntegrityNone
  • AvailabilityNone

What an attacker needs

  • ✓Access: Reachable over the network — no local access needed
  • ✓Privileges: No account or privileges required
  • ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
  • ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable
  • ⚠Requirements: Specific conditions must be present

✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it

Proof of concept

No public PoC is currently catalogued.

Search for new PoCs

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Tracked sources are checked daily for recent CVEs, including PoCs published after the original disclosure. A later release appears after a tracked source lists it and a refresh succeeds.

Data snapshot:

Affected

Vendors Follow Redirects

Products Follow Redirects

Weakness (CWE)

  • CWE-200: : Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
  • CWE-212: : Improper Removal of Sensitive Information Before Storage or Transfer

CVSS vector

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References and research data (JSON)

Packages and version ranges

Each advisory describes its own package and affected ranges. A boundary applies to that range; it is not a universal upgrade recommendation.

  • follow-redirects npm

    pkg:npm/follow-redirects

    SEMVER range
    • Introduced version (included): 1.16.0
    • Fixed boundary (excluded): 1.16.1
    Additional upstream package constraints
    {
  "database": {
    "source": "https://github.com/github/advisory-database/blob/main/advisories/github-reviewed/2026/10/GHSA-q3jh-wrc6-jgq8/GHSA-q3jh-wrc6-jgq8.json"
  }
}
    GitHub Advisory Database · GHSA-q3jh-wrc6-jgq8 · Updated 2026-10-20T18:15:04.527852751Z

Vendor product assessments

  • grafana12.4-0:12.4.13-0.3.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=aarch64&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-aarch64-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana12.4-0:12.4.13-0.3.hum1@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=src&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-source-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana12.4-0:12.4.13-0.3.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=x86_64&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-x86_64-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.1-0:13.1.8-0.4.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=aarch64&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-aarch64-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.1-0:13.1.8-0.4.hum1@s390x as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=s390x&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-s390x-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.1-0:13.1.8-0.4.hum1@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=src&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-source-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.1-0:13.1.8-0.4.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=x86_64&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-x86_64-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.2-0:13.2.4-0.3.hum1@aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=aarch64&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-aarch64-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.2-0:13.2.4-0.3.hum1@s390x as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=s390x&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-s390x-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.2-0:13.2.4-0.3.hum1@src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=src&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-source-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • grafana13.2-0:13.2.4-0.3.hum1@x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · fixed

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=x86_64&distro=hummingbird-20251124&repository_id=public-hummingbird-x86_64-rpms

    • vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://images.redhat.com/ Vendor guidance
    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • prometheus3.5.src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · known affected

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=src

    • workaround: --- CME Mitigation Guidance (2026-10-20) --- Disclaimer: The following mitigation solutions are provided as a courtesy, pending the application of an official patch. This content was generated utilizing AI tools in conjunction with data from https://cmetaxonomy.org. Customers are advised to independently evaluate and test these temporary mitigations within their own infrastructure. The highest-value action is to format all outgoing HTTP request headers as plain key-value objects rather than alternating arrays when invoking follow-redirects: upgrade to follow-redirects 1.16.1 (or the fixed Prometheus/Grafana builds), which detect if options.headers is an array and convert alternating name-value pairs into a plain JavaScript object before sanitizing and stripping headers, closing all 2 injection vectors (cross-origin HTTP redirect, protocol downgrade redirect). Until patched, this is a concern on Applications on any platform issuing requests with array-formatted sensitive headers via follow-redirects, so Configure outgoing requests to pass headers strictly as plain objects instead of alternating arrays and avoid contacting untrusted endpoints capable of triggering cross-origin redirects. These controls limit blast radius and contain exploitation, but they do not fix the underlying array-formatted header stripping bypass defect — apply the upstream patch to fully remediate.
    • no fix planned: Will not fix
    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00
  • prometheus3.13.src as a component of Red Hat Hardened Images · known not affected

    Vendor assessment for this product only.

    Reason: vulnerable code not present

    pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=src

    Red Hat · CVE-2026-111756 · Updated 2026-10-23T05:02:12+00:00

All CVSS metrics

  • HIGH 8.2 v4.0 · CNA Primary
    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
  • HIGH 8.2 v4.0 · NVD Secondary
    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

References

Exploit-tagged references (not proof of a PoC)

Advisories

Technical & other

Sources: NVD · CVE.org · EPSS