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CVE-2026-16148

MEDIUM 4.6

Published 2026-09-14 · Last modified 2026-09-14

The ITE it82xx2 USB device-controller driver initialized its bus-suspend detection work with k_work_init_delayable(&priv->suspended_work, suspended_handler) inside it82xx2_enable() (the driver's .enable op) in drivers/usb/udc/udc_it82xx2.c. This work item is scheduled essentially continuously while the USB bus is active: the interrupt handler reschedules it on every SOF frame and suspended_handler() reschedules itself, so its timeout node is normally linked in the kernel timeout list / a workqueue pending queue. k_work_init_delayable() (kernel/work.c) unconditionally overwrites the entire k_work_delayable structure, including its timeout and queue linkage, with no busy check. Because it82xx2_disable() does not cancel the work, a normal disable-then-enable cycle re-runs api->enable() (udc_enable() only rejects a redundant enable, not a re-enable after disable) and re-initializes the still-pending work in place, corrupting the kernel timeout/workqueue linked lists and causing a kernel panic. An external USB host — for example a host performing USB DFU detach (dfu-util --detach) or forcing repeated attach/reset/re-enumeration — drives the udc_disable()/udc_enable() transitions and controls suspend/resume timing, so it can arrange for the suspend work to be pending across a re-enable. This yields an unauthenticated denial of service (kernel panic) reachable across the USB boundary from a removable, physically-connected host, with no confidentiality or integrity impact demonstrated. The fix moves the k_work_init_delayable() call into the one-time preinit function so the work is initialized exactly once, eliminating the re-initialization of an in-use item.

NO EXPLOITATION SIGNALS

No known exploitation, public exploit, or elevated probability at this time. Track for changes.

Exploitation likelihood

0.2%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 14th percentile

○ In CISA KEV ○ Catalogued PoC

Impact if exploited

4.6CVSS 3.1 · MEDIUM

  • ConfidentialityNone
  • IntegrityNone
  • AvailabilityHigh

What an attacker needs

  • ⚠Access: Requires physical access to the device
  • ✓Privileges: No account or privileges required
  • ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
  • ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable

✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it

Proof of concept

No public PoC is currently catalogued.

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Data snapshot:

Affected

Vendors Zephyrproject

Products Zephyr

Weakness (CWE)

  • CWE-666: dos

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References and research data (JSON)

All CVSS metrics

  • MEDIUM 4.6 v3.1 · CNA Primary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
  • MEDIUM 4.6 v3.1 · NVD Secondary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

References

Patches & mitigations

Technical & other

Sources: NVD · CVE.org · EPSS