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CVE-2026-17052

HIGH 7.8

Published 2026-09-21 · Last modified 2026-09-21

The Time-aware GPIO syscall verification handler z_vrfy_tgpio_pin_read_ts_ec() in drivers/timeaware_gpio/timeaware_gpio_handlers.c validated only the port device object and passed the caller-supplied timestamp and event_count output pointers to the driver without a K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE() check. The other handlers in the same file (z_vrfy_tgpio_port_get_time(), z_vrfy_tgpio_port_get_cycles_per_second()) already performed that check, so the omission left one syscall unguarded. tgpio_pin_read_ts_ec() is declared __syscall, so with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y an unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to the TGPIO device object can invoke it with arbitrary pointer values. tgpio_intel_read_ts_ec() in drivers/timeaware_gpio/timeaware_gpio_intel.c bounds-checks only the pin index and then unconditionally performs timestamp = ... and event_count = ..., executing two 8-byte stores in supervisor mode at addresses chosen by the user-mode caller. The result is a write-what-where primitive that crosses the userspace/kernel boundary: the target address is fully attacker-chosen and the stored values are the hardware time-capture and event-counter register contents. Corrupting kernel data structures this way can escalate the calling thread to supervisor privilege or crash the system; the device-object permission required is a narrow capability that is not intended to confer any kernel-memory access. The fix adds the two missing K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE() validations before the driver call. Exposure is narrow in practice. Only builds with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y and CONFIG_TIMEAWARE_GPIO=y compile the affected file, and from v3.6.0 onward the file additionally referenced a relocated header (<zephyr/syscall_handler.h>) and removed Z_SYSCALL_* macros, so such a configuration failed to build until those were repaired after v4.4.0. Downstream trees that locally corrected that breakage, and v3.5.0 builds where it did not exist, are the exposed population.

ELEVATED IMPACT

Severe if exploited (CVSS 7.8), but no known exploitation and low modeled probability. Patch on a normal cadence.

Exploitation likelihood

0.2%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 6th percentile

○ In CISA KEV ○ Catalogued PoC

Impact if exploited

7.8CVSS 3.1 · HIGH

  • ConfidentialityHigh
  • IntegrityHigh
  • AvailabilityHigh

What an attacker needs

  • ⚠Access: Requires local access to the host
  • ⚠Privileges: Requires a low-privilege account
  • ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
  • ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable

✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it

Proof of concept

No public PoC is currently catalogued.

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Data snapshot:

Affected

Vendors Zephyrproject

Products Zephyr

Weakness (CWE)

  • CWE-787: memory-safety

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References and research data (JSON)

All CVSS metrics

  • HIGH 7.8 v3.1 · CNA Primary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • HIGH 7.8 v3.1 · NVD Secondary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

Patches & mitigations

Technical & other

Sources: NVD · CVE.org · EPSS