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CVE-2026-19576

MEDIUM 6.8

Published 2026-10-11 · Last modified 2026-10-15

The Goodix GT9xx input driver in drivers/input/input_gt911.c reads the touch point count from the controller's status register and masks it with GT911_TOUCH_POINTS_MSK (0x0F), yielding a value of 0..15. In gt911_process() that value is used directly as the loop bound for filling point_reg[], a stack array sized to CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS, whose Kconfig range is 1..5 with a default of 1. No other check constrains the count; the driver relied only on a comment asserting that the controller had been programmed at init to report no more points than configured. Each loop iteration issues an I2C read of eight bytes straight into point_reg[i], so a controller that reports more points than the array holds causes up to 112 bytes of peer-supplied data to be written past the end of the array, over the stack frame of gt911_process() in the system workqueue thread. Two further loops then read out of bounds from the same array. Triggering it requires control of, or the ability to substitute, the I2C touch controller — plausible on the many supported boards where the GT9xx panel is a pluggable display module or shield rather than an on-PCB part; a spoofed device need only answer the init probes with a supported product ID and a checksum-valid config blob. The same overflow can also occur non-adversarially, with a GT9271-class panel that ignores the driver's touch-count programming and reports up to ten points, or with bus corruption of the single status byte. The impact is an out-of-bounds stack write with fully attacker-chosen content executing at kernel privilege, i.e. potential control-flow hijack on the host MCU, in addition to out-of-bounds reads and crashes. The attack vector is physical/local hardware access only; there is no network, USB, or syscall path to the defect. The fix clamps the reported count with min() against CONFIG_INPUT_GT911_MAX_TOUCH_POINTS before any array indexing.

NO EXPLOITATION SIGNALS

No known exploitation, public exploit, or elevated probability at this time. Track for changes.

Exploitation likelihood

0.2%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 6th percentile

○ In CISA KEV ○ Catalogued PoC

Impact if exploited

6.8CVSS 3.1 · MEDIUM

  • ConfidentialityHigh
  • IntegrityHigh
  • AvailabilityHigh

What an attacker needs

  • ⚠Access: Requires physical access to the device
  • ✓Privileges: No account or privileges required
  • ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
  • ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable

✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it

Proof of concept

No public PoC is currently catalogued.

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Data snapshot:

Affected

Vendors Zephyrproject

Products Zephyr

Weakness (CWE)

  • CWE-787: bounds

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References and research data (JSON)

All CVSS metrics

  • MEDIUM 6.8 v3.1 · CNA Primary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
  • MEDIUM 6.8 v3.1 · NVD Secondary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

References

Patches & mitigations

Technical & other

Sources: NVD · CVE.org · EPSS