CVE-2026-64600
HIGH 7.8 ALL-YEARSIn the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: resample the data fork mapping after cycling ILOCK xfs_reflink_fill_{cow_hole,delalloc} are both presented with an inode, a data fork mapping, and a cow fork mapping. Unfortunately, these two helpers cycle the ILOCK to grab a transaction, which means that the mappings are stale as soon as we reacquire the ILOCK. Currently we refresh the cow fork mapping by re-calling xfs_find_trim_cow_extent, but we don't refresh the data fork mapping beforehand, which means that the xfs_bmap_trim_cow in that function queries the refcount btree about the wrong physical blocks and returns an inaccurate value in *shared. If *shared is now false, the directio write proceeds with a stale data fork mapping. Fix this by querying the data fork mapping if the sequence counter changes across the ILOCK cycle.
Severe if exploited (CVSS 7.8), but no confirmed exploitation. Patch on a normal cadence.
Exploitation likelihood
0.5%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 40th percentile
Impact if exploited
7.8CVSS 3.1 · HIGH · CNA
- ConfidentialityHigh
- IntegrityHigh
- AvailabilityHigh
What an attacker needs
- ⚠Access: Requires local access to the host
- ⚠Privileges: Requires a low-privilege account
- ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
- ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable
✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it
Proof of concept
No public PoC is currently catalogued.
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Tracked sources are checked weekly for the full archive, including PoCs published after the original disclosure. A later release appears after a tracked source lists it and a refresh succeeds.
Weakness (CWE)
- CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References and research data (JSON)
Vendor product assessments
Showing 32 of 2223 vendor product statements; 2191 omitted. Read the full vendor advisory.
kernel-0:6.12.0-231.17.el10nv.aarch64 as a component of NVIDIA for RHEL 10 · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]?arch=aarch64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-debuginfo-common-aarch64-0:6.12.0-211.34.1.el10_2.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 10) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_2?arch=aarch64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-devel-0:5.14.0-427.138.1.el9_4.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream E4S (v.9.4) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_4?arch=aarch64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-debuginfo-common-x86_64-0:5.14.0-687.26.1.el9_8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux AppStream (v. 9) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_8?arch=x86_64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
libperf-debuginfo-0:6.12.0-55.89.1.el10_0.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS EUS (v. 10.0) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_0?arch=aarch64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-debug-0:4.18.0-553.144.1.el8_10.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS (v. 8) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_10?arch=aarch64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-debug-core-0:4.18.0-305.198.1.el8_4.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS EUS EXTENSION (v.8.4) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_4?arch=x86_64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
perf-debuginfo-0:4.18.0-477.154.1.el8_8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v.8.8) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_8?arch=x86_64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kpatch-patch-5_14_0-284_158_1-0:1-8.el9_2.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v.9.2) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_2?arch=x86_64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kpatch-patch-5_14_0-427_68_2-debuginfo-0:1-18.el9_4.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS E4S (v.9.4) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_4?arch=ppc64le
- vendor fix: Before applying this update, make sure all previously released errata relevant to your system have been applied. For details on how to apply this update, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kpatch-patch-5_14_0-570_66_1-debugsource-0:1-11.el9_6.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux BaseOS EUS (v.9.6) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_6?arch=ppc64le
- vendor fix: Before applying this update, make sure all previously released errata relevant to your system have been applied. For details on how to apply this update, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-rt-64k-debug-debuginfo-0:6.12.0-55.89.1.el10_0.aarch64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux CodeReady Linux Builder EUS (v. 10.0) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_0?arch=aarch64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-debug-debuginfo-0:5.14.0-687.26.1.el9_8.ppc64le as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux CodeReady Linux Builder (v. 9) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_8?arch=ppc64le
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
libperf-debuginfo-0:5.14.0-570.128.1.el9_6.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux Real Time for NFV EUS (v.9.6) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_6?arch=x86_64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel-rt-debug-devel-0:4.18.0-553.144.1.rt7.485.el8_10.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux RT (v. 8) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_10?arch=x86_64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
python3-perf-debuginfo-0:5.14.0-687.26.1.el9_8.x86_64 as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux Real Time (v. 9) · fixed
Vendor assessment for this product only.
pkg:rpm/redhat/[email protected]_8?arch=x86_64
- vendor fix: For details on how to apply this update, which includes the changes described in this advisory, refer to: https://access.redhat.com/articles/11258 The system must be rebooted for this update to take effect. Vendor guidance
- workaround: This vulnerability can be mitigated using a SystemTap script. To create and apply the mitigation, follow the steps below: 1. Install and configure SystemTap Install the SystemTap package and its dependencies following the instructions at: https://docs.redhat.com/en/documentation/red_hat_enterprise_linux/10/html/monitoring_and_managing_system_status_and_performance/getting-started-with-systemtap 2. Create the mitigation script Create a file named `refluxfs_mitigation.stp` with the following contents: ~~~ probe begin { printf("refluxfs mitigation loaded\n") } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").call { $remap_flags = 0xffff } probe module("xfs").function("xfs_file_remap_range").return { $return = -95 } probe end { printf("refluxfs mitigation unloaded\n") } ~~~ 3. Load the mitigation As the `root` user, execute SystemTap in guru mode: ~~~ stap -g refluxfs_mitigation.stp ~~~ Once the script is compiled and loaded, the following message will appear: ~~~ refluxfs mitigation loaded ~~~ With the mitigation active, any application attempting to use reflink to copy files will receive `-EOPNOTSUPP` (`-95`) when calling the `FICLONE` ioctl (or its variants) or the `copy_file_range()` syscall. Important considerations: 1. SystemTap scripts are compiled into kernel modules. On systems with Secure Boot enabled, the kernel is in lockdown mode and will only load modules signed with a valid Secure Boot key or a key enrolled in the MOK. SystemTap can sign the generated module at compile time, but the user is responsible for key management. For instructions, refer to the "Sign a SystemTap module" section of: https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-boot-systemtap 2. The SystemTap module is not persistent across reboots. If the machine is restarted or the `stap` process is terminated, the module will be unloaded and the mitigation must be reapplied. 3. Programs that rely on CoW/reflink without a fallback mechanism may fail, as reflink operations will be unavailable on any XFS filesystem while the mitigation is loaded. This includes the `cp` command when run with `--reflink=always`. In that case, use `--reflink=auto` instead, which is the default behavior in Red Hat Enterprise Linux.
kernel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-debug as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-debug
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-devel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-devel
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-headers as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-headers
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel.src as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel?arch=src
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00bpftool as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/bpftool
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-abi-whitelists as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-abi-whitelists
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-debug-devel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-debug-devel
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-headers as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-headers
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-rt as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-rt
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-rt-debug-devel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-rt-debug-devel
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-rt-doc as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-rt-doc
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-rt-trace-devel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-rt-trace-devel
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-tools as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-tools
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00kernel-tools-libs-devel as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/kernel-tools-libs-devel
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00python-perf as a component of Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 · known not affected
Vendor assessment for this product only.
Reason: vulnerable code not present
pkg:rpm/redhat/python-perf
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
Unverified PoC candidates
Catalogue matches for further research. These repositories have not been validated as working exploits.
10 candidates
- https://github.com/0xBlackash/CVE-2026-64600
CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-08-20T08:08:58Z - https://github.com/HORKimhab/CVE-2026-64600
CVE-2026-64600 - Draft - Check todo
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-08-24T18:46:35Z - https://github.com/vulnquest58/VQ-RefluxCore
is an advanced security research framework designed to model, analyze, and demonstrate Local Privilege Escalation (LPE) mechanics associated with kernel-level race conditions and filesystem structure vulnerabilities (CVE-2026-64600 / RefluXFS)
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-08-06T06:18:29Z - https://github.com/Debajyoti0-0/CVE-2026-64600
A C-based Linux security utility for detecting, safely verifying (Proof of Concept), and mitigating CVE-2026-64600 (RefluXFS). It provides kernel vulnerability assessment, XFS reflink detection, a safe race-condition PoC, and layered mitigation using SystemTap and XFS hardening.
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-22T17:10:29Z - https://github.com/litosmartin/CVE-2026-64600-Refluxfs-PoC
A POC for the recently discovered Qualys bug on COW with XFS
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-08-31T02:53:24Z - https://github.com/bha-vin/CVE-2026-64600-ExploitPoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-07-28T09:42:55Z - https://github.com/letsr00t/RefluxFS_CVE-2026-64600PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-08-04T06:58:59Z - https://github.com/masrikky/CVE-2026-64600-RefluXFS
A Linux kernel local privilege escalation affecting the XFS filesystem copy-on-write (CoW) path.
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-08-14T05:01:45Z - https://github.com/0xSec1/CVE-2026-64600-RefluXFS-PoC
PoC for RefluXFS
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-08-14T12:57:38Z - https://github.com/k4ntux/COWSlip
xfs kernel LPE (CVE-2026-64600), disclosed by Qualys on 22 July 2026
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600
PoC-in-GitHub · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-26T16:38:10Z
Known Affected Software Configurations
| Vendor | Product | Version range |
|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux Kernel | ≥ 4.11 and < 5.15.212 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | ≥ 5.16 and < 6.1.178 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | ≥ 6.2 and < 6.6.145 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | ≥ 6.7 and < 6.12.96 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | ≥ 6.13 and < 6.18.39 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | ≥ 6.19 and < 7.1.4 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | 7.2 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | 7.2 |
| Linux | Linux Kernel | 7.2 |
All CVSS metrics
- HIGH 7.8 v3.1 · CNA Primary
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - HIGH 7.8 v3.1 · NVD Secondary
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
References
Exploit-tagged references (not proof of a PoC)
- https://cdn2.qualys.com/advisory/2026/07/22/RefluXFS.txt CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500
Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/14 CVE record · CVE · Updated 2026-08-03T20:31:20.507Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500
Patches & mitigations
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc11be133efca5fe3a2fb02b016dee825cc12f18 CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b8c9aa832b52680ee40d6cab0efb081f9a69df05 CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/50f0012da1040f69a4e788cd9aed587c9a04983f CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e705d81a7193dd19e69b8e2bad4696d78a4ea075 CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/206c09b04dc5469c7ff14d8aceff2d47c88078d9 CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/44f891bc088958399eec27f7604928694aa35581 CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2f4acd0fcd862e22eab45690ec2c08c80b6ef2e7 CVE record · Linux · Updated 2026-08-17T04:58:23.073Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500
Advisories
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-64600.json Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://euvd.enisa.europa.eu/vulnerability/EUVD-2026-47879 EUVD · EUVD-2026-47879
Technical & other
- http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/18 CVE record · CVE · Updated 2026-08-03T20:31:20.507Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/22/19 CVE record · CVE · Updated 2026-08-03T20:31:20.507Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/07/31/3 CVE record · CVE · Updated 2026-08-03T20:31:20.507Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/03/4 CVE record · CVE · Updated 2026-08-03T20:31:20.507Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/03/8 CVE record · CVE · Updated 2026-08-03T20:31:20.507Z
NVD · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-10-19T21:17:49.500 - https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-64600 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2498915 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-64600 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64600 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:39321 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39494 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41063 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:39332 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41062 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39179 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39984 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:41229 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47997 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47984 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47983 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:40425 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:39180 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:41013 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:46951 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47998 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2026:41254 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:48016 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
- https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2026:47981 Red Hat · CVE-2026-64600 · Updated 2026-09-29T08:57:37+00:00
Sources: NVD · CVE.org · All sources and attribution · EPSS