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CVE-2026-79976

HIGH 7.1

Published 2026-10-21 · Last modified 2026-10-23

The MCTP-over-I2C+GPIO target binding in subsys/pmci/mctp/mctp_i2c_gpio_target.c emulates a small pseudo-register file, where the bus controller first writes a register number and then writes or reads payload bytes. The selected register (b->reg_addr) and the data-phase flag (b->rxtx) were never cleared when the controller issued an I2C STOP, so after a completed transfer the target still had a data register selected while the packet buffer that register refers to had already been consumed and set to NULL by mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop(). A controller on the bus can re-enter the same branch of mctp_i2c_gpio_target_stop() with a NULL buffer using two ordinary transactions and no authentication: first a normal packet write to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_RX_MSG_ADDR followed by STOP (which delivers and frees b->rx_pkt), then a bare read transaction followed by STOP. The failing read_requested() call leaves the stale state untouched and the I2C driver still delivers the STOP callback, which then calls mctp_bus_rx() with a NULL packet. The symmetric case exists on the transmit side, where the stale MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TX_MSG_ADDR selection dereferences b->tx_pkt->end after b->tx_pkt has been cleared and additionally signals b->tx_complete a second time, causing the next outbound packet to be dropped. The dereference happens in the I2C target interrupt handler, so on any target that traps accesses to address 0 the result is a fatal exception and a device reset or halt — a denial of service inflicted by any device able to act as controller on the shared management bus (for example compromised firmware on a peer MCTP endpoint or on the BMC). On parts where address 0 is readable, the impact degrades to a malformed packet buffer being handed to the MCTP stack and lost transmit packets. No attacker-controlled value is written and no confidentiality or integrity boundary is crossed. The fix resets b->reg_addr to MCTP_I2C_GPIO_INVALID_ADDR and clears b->rxtx at every STOP, so a new register must be selected before any data phase can run again. Only builds that opt into the experimental CONFIG_MCTP subsystem with CONFIG_MCTP_I2C_GPIO_TARGET=y are affected.

ELEVATED IMPACT

Severe if exploited (CVSS 7.1), but no known exploitation and low modeled probability. Patch on a normal cadence.

Exploitation likelihood

0.3%chance of exploitation in 30 days · 17th percentile

○ In CISA KEV ○ Catalogued PoC

Impact if exploited

7.1CVSS 3.1 · HIGH

  • ConfidentialityLow
  • IntegrityNone
  • AvailabilityHigh

What an attacker needs

  • ⚠Access: Must sit on the same / adjacent network
  • ✓Privileges: No account or privileges required
  • ✓User interaction: No user interaction needed
  • ✓Complexity: No special conditions — reliably repeatable

✓ lowers the bar for an attacker · ⚠ raises it

Proof of concept

No public PoC is currently catalogued.

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Data snapshot:

Affected

Vendors Zephyrproject

Products Zephyr

Weakness (CWE)

  • CWE-476: memory-safety

CVSS vector

CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H

References and research data (JSON)

All CVSS metrics

  • HIGH 7.1 v3.1 · CNA Primary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H
  • HIGH 7.1 v3.1 · NVD Secondary
    CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:H

References

Patches & mitigations

Technical & other

Sources: NVD · CVE.org · EPSS